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MORTGAGE CONSENT TO SALE CLAUSE:
A REASONABLE RESTRAINT ON ALIENATION?
INTRODUCTION

From the beginning of its Anglo-Saxon origin, American
jurisprudence has adhered to the proposition that restraints on
alienation of real property are void.' The rule is based on social
policy which recognizes that such restraints take property out
of commerce. It attempts to rectify the undesirable consequences of concentration of land in the hands of a few, unnatural
increases in land values, and waste by those who no longer have
need to improve the property or put the land to beneficial and
productive use.2 With the passage of time it became apparent
that some restraints on alienation were socially desirable and
some exceptions were permitted.3 Though exceptions developed
to accommodate acceptable social goals, the rule remained otherwise firm. What developed was a pigeonhole application of the
rule: if a restraint could be shown to fall within one of the
recognized exceptions, it would be sustained; otherwise the restraint would be void.
Until recently, the mortgage consent-to-sale clause has been
held void as a restraint on alienation. 4 Such a clause simply
requires that before a mortgagor can alienate the mortgaged
property, he must obtain the consent of the mortgagee. The
clause is employed by mortgagees to further protect their security interest. If the property is alienated in violation of the
clause, the mortgagee seeks to void the transfer. When the consent-to-sale clause is used in connection with an acceleration
clause, the mortgagee attempts to void the transfer and accelerate payment. The past failure of attempts to enforce a mortgage consent-to-sale clause can be attributed to the axiom that
a mortgagor may at any time dispose of his title held in fee. 5
The consent-to-sale clause attempts to prohibit transfer of the
property title.
This conflict raises the issue of whether such a clause meets
with the goals of social policy and thus should be adopted as
another exception to the rule against restraints on alienation.
1.

H.

CAREY

& D.

SCHUYLER, ILLINOIS LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS

41 (1941) [hereinafter cited as

CAREY

& SCHUYLER].
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2. Bernhard, The Minority Doctrine Concerning Direct Restraints On
Alienation, 57 MICH. L. REV. 1173, 1179-80 (1959) [hereinafter cited as
Bernhard].
3. See text accompanying notes 14-33 infra.
4. Bernhard, note 2 supra, at 1176.
5. 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 389 (1949).
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Perhaps the emphasis should be shifted from consideration of
new exceptions to consideration of whether a test of reasonableness should be applied to the restraint. The issue then becomes
whether a test weighing the reasonableness of the restraint
would better serve the rule than having the rule itself engulfed
by its many exceptions. Based on such a proposition, the rule
would be implemented as the rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation.
To the mortgagee seeking to validate a consent-to-sale clause,
the effect of the conceptual differences between a rule with exceptions and an exclusionary test removing conduct from the
parameters of the rule is negligible: either way the benefits of
the clause obtain. Nevertheless, by applying the reasonableness
test, the courts would have greater flexibility in assessing both
the establishment of or implementation of new restraints. Attorneys would be able to argue their cases under the broader
concepts of reasonableness and fairness rather than be restricted
to showing that a restraint falls within the technical bounds of
some pre-established exception.
At present, the rule-with-exceptions approach is exercised
by the majority of jurisdictions. Such an approach is limited
to a class-by-class application. Once a factual situation falls
within or without one of the exceptions, the law is strictly applied. On the other hand, the minority doctrine applying the
reasonable restraint test allows for case by case implementation.
Between the two, the latter tends to operate as a rule of exclusion, denying relief where it otherwise might be warranted. Until very recently, only Kentucky applied the reasonable restraint
6
test.
While the mortgage consent-to-sale clause could be fashioned
as a new exception under the rule-with-exceptions approach, the
better argued position is that validation be based on the premise
that such a restraint is not socially unreasonable. The courts
would retain flexibility to ascertain the reasonableness of the
restraints as applied to the circumstances in the cases before
them. As an exercise in legal reasoning, a rule prohibiting unreasonable restraints on alienation settles on more solid foundation that does a rule which first strips all restraints of their
validity and then begins mending its error of exclusivity by
creating exceptions to itself, especially where such restraints are
reasonable as determined by social policy..
The scope of this comment is to examine the nature of restraints on alienation, with a view toward the application of a
6. Bernhard, note 2 supra, at 1176.
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test of reasonableness and the suitability of the mortgage consent-to-sale clause in meeting this test. To this end a survey
will first be made of the rule and the exceptions allowed under
it. This survey is to be followed by an historical tracing of the
rule against restraints as applied in Illinois, including the recent
rise of the reasonableness doctrine in Illinois. Further, the interest sought to be protected by the mortgage consent-to-sale clause
will be considered. Finally, judicial balancing of that interest
with the interests to be protected by the rule against restraints
will be explored to determine the way the scales of justice are
tilting.
NATURE

OF THE RULE AGAINST

RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION

To ensure freedom of alienation at common law, two devices
evolved: the rule against perpetuities and the rule against restraints on alienation. Both deal with suspension of the power
of alienation but in different ways.7 The rule against perpetuities is a rule against remoteness and voids any limitation which
postpones the vesting of interest in property beyond lives in being plus twenty-one years.8 The rule against restraints on alienation operates on interests already vested and voids provisions
which prohibit alienation. 9 These concepts are often confused.
In the case of mortgage agreements and consent-to-sale clauses
it should be understood that they do not affect the vesting of
the property interest, but take effect upon an interest already
vested. Thus, they do not offend the remoteness doctrine characteristic of the rule against perpetuities. This distinction is important because the rule against perpetuities is sometimes used
to limit one of the exceptions to the rule against restraints. 10
Generally, restraints may be classified into three categories:
disabling restraints, forfeiture restraints and promissory restraints. Under a disabling restraint, any attempt at alienation
contrary to the restraint is void and title never moves from the
restrained party." Such restraints are generally ineffective12 as
7. Goddard, Non-Assignment ProvisionsIn Land Contracts, 31 McH.

L. REv. 1, 2-4 (1932) thereinafter cited as Goddard].

8. See generally T. BERGIN & P. HASKELL, PREFACE To ESTATES IN
LAND AND FUTURE IN1EREsTS 183-230 (1966).

9. Goddard, note 7 supra,at 2-4.
10. See text accompanying notes 14-19 infra. An acknowledged exception to the rule against restraints on alienation deals with restraints
qualified as to time wherein an otherwise acceptable restraint is voided
for extending beyond the rule against perpetuities. Manning, The Development Of Restraints On Alienation Since Gray, 48 HAv. L. REv. 373,
381-91 (1935) [hereinafter cited as Manning].
11. Bernhard, note 2 supra, at 1173. For example, where a party attempts to transfer title to a member of the Negro race, in violation of
a disabling restraint, title never passes to the vendee. The injustice done

516 The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure [Vol. 8:513
applied to real estate because of their arbitrary nature and the
injustices worked on bona fide purchasers. Under a forfeiture
restraint, any attempt at alienation contrary to the restraint
causes the property to be forfeited to the party claiming equitable rights under the restraint. A promissory restraint exists
when a party has promised not to alienate the property. This
type of restraint is enforceable by contract remedies and has no
direct impact on the title to the property. Further, disabling
restraints are absolute, whereas forfeiture and promissory restraints may be eliminated by agreement of the parties. 13 Under
the disabling restraint, the party imposing the restraint does not
retain any interest thereby in the property and, therefore, cannot
alter the terms of the restraint. Under the forfeiture or promissory restraint the party imposing the restraint thereby retains
an interest in the property and, therefore, may join with the
restrained party to alter the terms of the restraint.
Many exceptions to the rule against restraints have sprung
up under forfeiture and promissory restraints. Only a few will
be treated here to show the nature of the restraints which the
courts have allowed. These will give clues as to the considerations which will influence the development of the reasonable restraint test.
Restraints as to Time
A restraint as to time prohibits further conveyance for a
specified period of time. In Illinois restraints upon alienation
of a fee, though limited as to time, are invalid. 1 4 However, such
limited restraints have been allowed elsewhere.' 5 Generally, the
maximum amount of time over which a restraint may last is
that set forth in the rule against perpetuities: lives in being
plus twenty-one years.'
Although there are no decisions sustaining a restriction otherwise unqualified for a period of that
length, the adoption of this time limitation by text writers has
been taken from dicta claiming such restraints valid.1 7 It should
be noted, however, that in voiding restraints as to time for being
too long, a court would be applying the law prohibiting restraints
on alienation, not the rule against perpetuities. The latter would
simply be used as a measuring stick because the rule itself apis that the vendee may not discover this until some later date. Under
the forfeiture or promissory restraint, there is some third party who has
an interest to protect and who will come forward immediately.
12. Id.
13. Id.at 1174.
14. McFadden v. McFadden, 302 Ill. 504, 135 N.E. 31 (1922).
15. Manning, note 10 supra, at 381.
16. Id. at 383-91.
17. Id. at 386-87.
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plies to remoteness in vesting not to restraints on vested rights.
Nevertheless, caution dictates that terms within the bounds of
the rule against perpetuities be used. Restraints so limited are
not viewed in a vacuum, but rather consideration is given to the
reasons for using such restraints. It is clear that such restraints
will not 'be sustained simply because they are present and within
the time span of the rule against perpetuities.' 8 Carey and
Schuyler in Illinois Law of FutureInterests warn:
While it is true that time restrictions are thus capable of judicial
control, if recognized, it is not at all apparent that temporal restrictions have, as a rule, the socially desirable objectives that
so frequently motivate the creation of personal as distinguished
from temporal restraint. This the same writer concedes to be
true and upon this assumption it is not difficult to understand
and, indeed, to justify the decisions which nullify temporal restraints completely.' 9

Nevertheless, it seems that temporal restraints have gained
wide acceptance and when combined with other acceptable restraints may themselves be a tool in meeting the elements of
the reasonable restraint test.
Restraintsas to Persons

Restraints as to persons or classes of persons are generally
recognized in most of the United States. 20 Professor John Chipman Gray stated the rule in its most general terms to be that
conditions not to alien to a particular class are good, while condi21
tions forbidding alienation except to a particular class are void.
The true test to be used is one of reasonableness as to the size
of the class to be excluded. Carey and Schuyler noted:
The conclusion is therefore inevitable that restrictions of this
character should be sustained whenever they are22 reasonably
designed to attain accepted social and economic ends.
Thus, it can be seen that the reasonableness test is in fact being
used to create this exception. It is difficult to determine whether
the test or the exception is the standard, or why the latter is
necessary.
Applying a limitation as to persons in a consent-to-sale
clause would be impractical and in many instances would involve
too large a class. However, some sort of exclusion as to a class
of persons designated as high credit risks, when combined with
a reasonable restraint clause as to time, would compel courts to
18. Id. at 386-91.
19. CAREY &SCHUYLER, note 1 supra, at 543.
20. Manning, note 10 supra, at 375.

21. J. GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY 74 (1898).
22. CAREY & SCHUYLER, note 1 supra, at 549.
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take note of the limited restraints being used and consider these
factors in ruling on the clause.
Restraints as to Mode
This exception to the rule against restraints is narrowly
limited where accepted. 23 For example, a restraint that further
transfer may be by sale alone does not appear to fall within this
exception. 24 Instead, it seems to be limited only to restraints
in conveyances to tenants in common which prohibit partition
during a given period. 25 However, the limitations on this exception do not foreshadow the demise of the arguments applied to
the consent-to-sale clause because that clause does not relate to
mode of transfer.
Spendthrift Trust
A spendthrift trust is one in which, either because of a direction by the settlor or because of statute, the beneficiary is unable
to transfer his right to the property while it remains in the control of the trustee. The restraint is against present transfer of
property to be received by the beneficiary in the future. Once
the property is transfered from the trustee to the beneficiary,
the spendthrift clause ceases to be effective and the beneficiary
is free to further convey the property.
This device, as a restraint on alienation, enjoys the broadest
support of all the exceptions to the rule against such restraints.
Spendthrift trusts do not involve fee interests in land, but they
nevertheless demonstrate the judicial support which a restraint
on alienation can obtain once it is determined to be reasonable.
The spendthrift trust is designed to protect and provide for the
beneficiary. This benevolent goal has won for the trust its wide
acceptance.
Pre-emption Rights
Another type of restraint on alienation which has gained
recognition is that containing pre-emption provisions which require that before land can be sold, it must be offered to the
grantor or other specified party. This accepted restraint may
serve as a model for the courts to rely upon in holding the consent-to-sale clause to be a reasonable restraint. Pre-emption
rights are widely accepted if reasonable. 26 In validating such
23. Manning, note 10 supra, at 391-94.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 393.
26. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 413(2) (1944). The rule against restraints on alienation is applicable to pre-emption rights. However, an

1975]

Mortgage Consent to Sale Clauses

restraints the courts have displayed the ability to discern the
reasonable from the unreasonable, and this tendency of the
courts should be a source of confidence to those seeking to validate the consent-to-sale clause.
Normally, a pre-emption clause contains a formulation to
establish a repurchase price and has been sustained. 27 If, on the
one hand, the repurchase price is fixed at the time of the initial
sale, it is voided as unreasonable. 28
Similarly, formulations
which give the repurchaser control over the price are usually
held invalid. 29 On the other hand, it appears that formulations
based on objective standards or within the control of the owner
would be sustained.3 0 The courts have been willing in this area
to weigh the interests of both parties and, when reasonably
81
balanced, have sustained the restraints.
If the courts have fashioned a set of rules applicable to preemptive restraints, it seems that a similar set of rules could be
fashioned regarding consent-to-sale clauses. Such a set of rules
under a reasonableness standard would only have to insure that
the written clause does not violate the time limitation of the
rule against perpetuities, that it does not offend limitations as
to class and that it does not otherwise restrict mode of alienation. If these conditions are satisfied, the courts could then explore the reasonableness of the restraint by balancing the interests of the mortgagor against the interests of the mortgagee and
society.
Non-assignment Provisionsin Land Installment Contracts
In the land installment contract the vendor finances the sale
by retaining legal title while the vendee makes installment pay32
ments and retains equitable title in the land. Sloman v. Cutler
established that a stipulation that the vendee not assign his interest without vendor's consent is valid. It should be noted, however, that the land installment contract differs from a mortgage
exception has been created as to conditional fees. Where the pre-emptive rights arise under conditions subsequent to the property transfer,
they are held invalid as violations of the rule against restraints on alienation. Libby v. Winston, 207 Ala. 681, 93 So. 631 (1922). See Annot., 40
A.L.R.3d 920, 931 (1971).
27. Beets v. Tyler, 365 Mo. 895, 290 S.W.2d 76 (1956).
28. Kershner v. Hurlburt, 277 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. 1955) (court found
restraint to be "substantial").
29. Concannon v. Haile, 81 Pa. D.&C. 480 (1952).
30. See Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 934 (1971).
31. Missouri State Highway Comm'r v. Stone, 311 S.W.2d 588 (Mo.
App. 1958). There, the court looked to, (1) the purpose for which the
restraint is imposed, (2) the duration of the restraint, (3) the method
of determining the price to be paid.

32. 258 Mich. 372, 242 N.W. 735 (1932).
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situation in that the vendor has legal title and vendee equitable
title. Thus, the restriction is upon the equitable title. In a mortgage arrangement the mortgagee has equitable claims and tries
to restrain the mortgagor's right of alienation of his legal title.
Despite these reversed roles, the rationale used to support the
non-assignment clause is applicable to the consent-to-sale clause.
There is no undue restraint on alienation. The restrained party
may, by full performance in accordance with the agreement, secure full legal and equitable title with right to free disposal of
the land. Further, the parties may join together and alienate
the property at any time.
From this historical review it can be seen that the development of the rule against restraints on alienation has been riddled
with exceptions. An examination of these exceptions reveals
that the foundation for each exception has rested on the principle
that the restraint sought to be enforced was reasonable. In fact,
some of the exceptions apply the reasonable restraint test to de33
termine if a particular restraint falls within the exception.
Courts have begun to recognize this anomaly and have taken
steps to make reasonableness of restraint the sole test. A closer
inspection of this shift in judicial posture as it relates to Illinois
law deserves consideration.
ILLINOIS INTERPRETATION OF THE

AGAINST RESTRAINTS

RULE

ON ALIENATION

Illinois has long been a haven for the strict application of
the rule against restraints on alienation. Exceptions widely applied elsewhere have not been recognized in Illinois. In McFadden v. McFadden34 a conveyance of property was made by
a father to his son with a condition subsequent that the son not
further convey the property for twenty years following the
father's death. The court found that the clause restraining
alienation was repugnant to the estate conveyed and void as
against public policy. Similarly, in Jenne v. Jenne3" the court
struck a clause restraining alienation as to persons. Here, a devise of property was made with the stipulation that no interest
in the property shall be given to Samuel Sean or his wife. The
court held that if a testator makes an absolute gift of property,
he cannot by another clause restrict the fee use or disposition.
Restraints as to mode of transfer met a similar fate in Noth
v. Noth.3 0 Anna Noth devised certain real estate to her children
33. See text accompanying notes 14-19 supra;Bernhard, note 2 supra.
34. 302 Ill. 504, 135 N.E. 31 (1922).
35. 271 Ill. 526, 111 N.E. 540 (1916).

36. 292 Ill. 536, 127 N.E. 113 (1920).
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with the restriction that further transfers be conditional upon
the death of a certain third party without issue. The court held
37
such restraint to be void. Finally, in McNamara v. McNamara,
the court again concluded that restraints upon a fee are void.
Here a devise to testator's children was sustained as to the fee
with the court removing the restraint prohibiting further transfer for fifteen years. The court held that where the restraints
on alienation of land in fee are invalid, the devise nevertheless
38
continues and the devisee takes an absolute fee.
Although Illinois has consistently refused to apply exceptions which are recognized in other jurisdictions, the Illinois Supreme Court, in Gale v. York Center Community Cooperative,
Inc., 39 chose to view the rule as voiding "unreasonable" restraints
on alienation. The court reviewed the rule and found that "the
crucial inquiry should be directed at the utility of the restraint
as compared with the injurious consequences that will flow from
its enforcement. ' 40
This expression of the issues raised by the
rule against restraints on alienation forebodes a shift from traditional applications of the rule. At this juncture, the court was
free to abandon its previous restrictive attitude. In so doing,
the court adopted a more precise version of the rule: that the
rule prohibited unreasonablerestraints on alienation. The court
formulated this version of the rule by stating:
If accepted social and economic considerations dictate that a partial restraint is reasonably necessary for their fulfillment, such
41
a restraint should be sustained.
Gale was an action by a co-operative housing association
against members to whom the association had deeded properties
pursuant to the membership agreement. The purpose of the
membership agreement was to convey a fee title and thus allow
the members to obtain their own mortgage financing. The particular restraint argued was that the co-operative was to have
a twelve-month option to repurchase the property if a party desired to sell. After this period lapsed, the party would be free
to sell. Applying the rule quoted above, the court directed the
members to reconvey their properties to the association pursuant
to the agreement. The restraint was held to be necessary to the
42
existence of the co-operative enterprise.
The matter was not again litigated until 1974 when, in Baker
v. Loves Park Savings and Loan Association,43 the Illinois Appel37. 293 Ill. 54, 127 N.E. 130 (1920).
38. Id.

39. 21 Ill. 2d 86, 171 NE.2d 30 (1960).
40. Id. at 92, 171 N.E.2d at 33.
41. Id.

42. Id. at 93, 171 N.E.2d at 33.
43. 21 Ill. App. 3d 42, 314 N.E.2d 306 (1974).

522 The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure [Vol. 8:513
late Court, Second District, remanded a mortgage consent-to-sale
clause case to the circuit court for application of the reasonable
restraint test. Loves Park, as mortgagee, had issued a mortgage
to Robert and Laurie Baker on their home in Rockford, Illinois.
The mortgage agreement contained a standard acceleration
clause:
'We further agree that upon any default upon this obligation, or
the instrument securing it, interest at the rate of 1 percent (1%)
per annum above the original rate provided herein on the unpaid
balance of this indebtedness may be charged for the period of
such default. Upon any default under this obligation, or the instrument securing it, at the option of the holder of this note, the
unpaid balance of this note, and any advances made under it,
or the instrument securing it, together with interest, shall become due and payable. .... ,44
It also contained a consent-to-sale clause which in relevant part
stated:
'A. THE MORTGAGOR COVENANTS DURING THE TERM
OF THIS MORTGAGE:
(8) Not to suffer or permit without the written permission or
consent of the Mortgagee being first had and obtained ...
(d) A sale, assignment or transfer of any right, title, or
interest in and to said property or any portion thereof. ..

.,45

The Bakers sold their house on installment contract to a
third party without first obtaining the mortgagee's consent.
Loves Park notified the plaintiffs that it would not consent to
the sale and that the note was therefore in default. The bank
opted to enforce the 1% penalty of the acceleration clause. However, the circuit court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs
by holding the consent-to-sale clause to be an unlawful restraint
on alienation.
On appeal, the appellate court took issue with the trial
court's holding that the restraint was unlawful because that
court neglected to first ascertain whether the restraint was unreasonable. In setting forth this test, the appellate court adopted
language similar to that used in Gale:
Consequently, only where a restraint in [sic] alienation is reasonably designed to attain or encourage accepted social or economic goals will it be sustained. 46
Thus, the Baker case affirmed the reasonable restraint test
enunciated in Gale. It is not clear from the Gale decision
whether the test requires a showing of both economic and social
reasonableness or whether a showing of one or the other is suf44. Id. at 43, 314 N.E.2d at 307-308.

45. Id.

46. Id. at 44, 317 N.E.2d at 308.
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ficient. The Gale court used the words "social and economic. '47
The Baker court, on the other hand, used the phrase "social or
economic. '45 It is safe to assume that demonstrating both would
meet the elements of the test. Also, a showing of accepted social
considerations would probably meet with judicial approval, since
many of the recognized exceptions under that theory are based
49
on social considerations.

Because Illinois courts have consistently rejected the exception-to-the-rule approach, compelling social considerations have
gained independent recognition as a prelude to application of the
reasonable restraint test. In Swannell v. Wilson ° a restraint
on alienation incorporated into a divorce decree was upheld because of the protection the clause provided to the wife. Like
spendthrift trusts, restraints which protect the interests of the
immediate family are apparently sustainable if not in conflict
with the rule against perpetuities. The court in Swannell refused the proposition that restraints on alienation were, per se,
against social policy and void. Instead, the court concluded that
a violation of public policy must first be shown in order to sustain a finding that the restraint was void. This theory was the
embryo of the reasonable restraints test.
In Dickenson v. City of Anna5 the Illinois Supreme Court
allowed a restraint upon alienation of property given to charity.
The Gale court cited both Swannell and Dickenson in support
of its own decision to apply the reasonable restraint test. 52 While
Gale used the conjunction "and" in its statement of the test, its
reliance on cases sustaining restraints which had only social
foundations gives weight to the proposition that social matters
which meet the reasonable restraint test will be sustained. Finally, the appellate court's change of conjunction to "or" in Baker
lends strong support to this thesis.
47. 21 Ill. 2d at 92, 171 N.E.2d at 33 (emphasis added).
48. 21 Ill. App. 3d 42, 44, 314 N.E.2d 306, 308

(1974)

(emphasis

added).
49. Bernhard, note 2 supra. Consider, for example, the spendthrift
trust.
50. 400 Ill. 138, 79 N.E.2d 26 (1948). Plaintiff and her husband entered into a property settlement agreement as part of their divorce settlement. It was therein provided that as to property held jointly by them,
neither party could sell their interest without the consent of the other.
Thus, the surviving party would take full title under right of survivor-

ship. The property in question was income producing. The husband attempted to convey the property to his second wife. The court found that
the agreement was designed to protect each party's respective interest
in the property. As part of the divorce decree, the settlement had been
given the sanction of the courts. The court held that the restraint was
not one restricting alienation in the sense of the general rule against restraints, but was to protect interest already held.
51. 310 Ill. 222, 141 N.E. 754 (1923).

52. 21 Ill. 2d at 92, 171 N.E.2d at 33.
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Uncertainty, however, surrounds the economic element. No
Illinois case can be found where economic factors alone were
recognized by a court to be sufficient to justify a finding that
the restraint was reasonable. Based on the facts, Gale certainly
approaches a result based solely on economic results. The real
benefit to be derived by the York Center Cooperative, Inc. was
economic control over its co-operative property. Benefits to society were negligible and related only to the stability maintained
in the community. Yet, it must be remembered that it was the
Gale court which used the conjunction "and" in creating social
and economic elements to be used in applying the reasonable restraint test. It appears that restraints which are only economically reasonable would not be sustained without a showing of
at least some social benefit. The more the economic considerations stabilize or benefit society, the more likely it is that sufficient social gain will be found and together the two elements
meet the test of reasonableness.
THE INTERESTS TO BE PROTECTED BY THE
MORTGAGE CONSENT-TO-SALE CLAUSE

Developing the reasonable restraint test and gaining judicial
cognizance of it is only a beginning in the process of its application. The application requires that the interest sought to be protected be clearly defined and then weighed against the social
policies that support the rule against restraints on alienation. In
the field of mortgages, the interest sought to be protected is that
of a security interest. When a consent-to-sale clause is incorporated into a mortgage agreement, the document attempts to protect two secured interests: the mortgage establishes the land as
security against default by the mortgagor, and the consent-tosale clause establishes the mortgagor's credit standing as security
against continued diminution of value in the property beyond
such time as the mortgagor is unable to himself pay the mortgage installments. These cross-security interests are designed to
53
protect the mortgagee's loan.
Land sales may be executed in a variety of ways. The
simplest and most conclusive is the direct sale whereby the buyer
pays the seller and receives title. The transaction is then at an
end. Another direct sales method is employed in the installment
sales contract in which the seller retains title while the buyer
makes payments on the contract. When an agreed upon sum
is paid, the legal title is transfered to the buyer. Under this
53. See text under sub-heading entitled, Continued Diminution in
Mortgage Property Value Through FinancedInstallments,infra.
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arrangement, the buyer has equitable title throughout the payment period and has immediate right to possession and use. In
contrast, mortgage transactions are indirect. The buyer finances
his payments by obtaining a mortgage. The seller transfers the
deed and legal title to the buyer while the mortgagee obtains
equitable title. Generally, the mortgagor can freely convey his
legal title to anyone. A purchaser of mortgaged property may
take the property and assume the mortgage, thereby becoming
liable on the mortgage along with his seller; or the buyer may
take the property subject to the mortgage, incurring no additional liability on the mortgage beyond the property. In all of
these methods the land serves as security against the mortgagor's
default in payment, but the land does not secure other risk factors sought to be protected by a mortgagee when he accepts the
mortgage. This difference is crucial to the mortgagee.
Continued Diminutionin Mortgage Property Value
Through FinancedInstallments
Under the methods of property financing described above,
if in a time of decreasing land values the mortgagor cannot make
his payments, he can sell the land and extend his ability to make
the mortgage payments in hopes of avoiding further depletion
of his personal assets. The risk to the mortgagee is that the
land value will fall below the value of the outstanding debt. Because the mortgagor has extended his ability to make payments,
default proceedings are not available to the mortgagee. He must
sit idly by as his security decreases in value. Then, when the
land becomes worthless and the third-party buyer is unable to
pay the mortgagor, he, the mortgagor, will become financially
disabled and will default. It is at this point that the mortgagee
can foreclose, but he may get only a worthless piece of property
and a cause of action against a bankrupt mortgagor.
The above represents an extended diminution of mortgaged
property value through financed installments, or "continued
diminution." It is precisely this risk which is sought to be protected against by the restraint on alienation through the consentto-sale clause. By use of the consent-to-sale clause in conjunction with an acceleration clause, the mortgagee can assess and
bargain with the prospective third-party buyer. Upon breach of
the consent-to-sale clause, the mortgagee can declare a default,
accelerate payment and, if necessary, foreclose before the value
of the land falls further than it would if the mortgagor were
allowed to make payments financed by the prohibited transfer
of the property.
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Interest Rates as a Function of Supply and Demand
And as Compensationfor Assumed Risks
In addition to protection against continued diminution in
value, some courts have found that the consent-to-sale clause is
justified to protect a mortgagee's right, in a climate of rising
interest rates, to use the clause to bargain with the third-party
purchaser for a new rate of interest. For example, in Cherry
v. Home Savings and Loan Association,54 a consent-to-sale clause
was upheld in an action against a mortgagor who attempted to
sell in violation of the clause. The court pointed out that a
lender places some value on the reliability of the person to whom
it loans money. A lender may be willing to loan money to a
credit-worthy party at one rate of interest, while as to a person
who represents a grave credit risk he may want to increase the
rate of interest charged. The court found the consent-to-sale
clause to be a legitimate method of reaching that goal.

THE

CONSENT-TO-SALE CLAUSE
AS A REASONABLE RESTRAINT

Since 1964, several courts have determined that it is reasonable for a lender to condition a granting of credit upon an agreement that the borrower retain his interest in the property securing the debt-in order to avoid the continued diminution risk. 55
In Coast Bank v. Minderhout,5 6 Burton and Donald Enright
executed notes on several loans made at Coast Bank. By separate agreement, the Enrights sold the property to the defendants.
The bank accelerated the due date, and upon failure to collect
the unpaid balance, it brought an action to foreclose on the property. The court recognized that the consent-to-sale clause constituted a restraint on alienation. Nevertheless, the court sustained
the consent-to-sale clause. After reviewing the rule against restraints and some of the exceptions to the rule, the court found
that:
In the present case it was not unreasonable for plaintiff to con-

dition its continued extension of credit to the Enrights on their
retaining their interest in the property that stood as security for
the debt. Accordingly, plaintiff validly provided that it might
accelerate the5 7due date if the Enrights encumbered or transfered
the property.
54. 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 81 Cal, Rptr. 135 (1969).

followed by courts in other jurisdictions.

This case has been

Malouff v. Midland Fed. Say.

& Loan Ass'n, 509 P.2d 1240 (Colo. 1973); Gunther v. White, 489 S.W.2d
529 (Tenn. 1973); Mutual Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wisconsin Wire
Works, 58 Wis. 2d 99, 205 N.W.2d 762 (1973).

55. The condition that the borrower retain his interest in the property
is set forth in a consent-to-sale clause.
56. 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1964).
57. Id. at 317, 392 P.2d at 268, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
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It is important to note that the consent-to-sale clause was
not part of a mortgage. Instead, it was a separate agreement
providing security on prior notes. The court sustained the clause
on the basis that the clause itself created an equitable mortgage.
The actual case for foreclosure was based upon the execution
of the acceleration clause contained in the notes. The crucial
link between the two agreements was that the default which
executed the acceleration clause was the transfer of the property
-not a failure to meet installment payments. Also noteworthy
is the court's expression of doubt that the consent-to-sale clause
could be specifically enforced in light of the availability of foreclosure as a remedy. 58 From this statement the consent-to-sale
clause became characterized as a forfeiture restraint rather than
a promissory restraint. It had been suggested that the interest
to be protected was the "continued extension of credit"5 9 and
that the restraint was reasonable because commercially compelling. 0
The Minderhout decision is significant not only for having
applied the reasonable restraint test, but also for suggesting a
new drafting tool to mortgage underwriters. All that remained
to be done after Minderhout was for the consent-to-sale clause
to be incorporated in mortgage agreements along with, or directly as part of, the acceleration clause.
The new drafting measure met with wide acceptance. In
1970 the courts in Ohio 1 and New York 6 2 sustained the mortgage
consent-to-sale clause. In Peoples Saving Association v. Standard Industries, Inc.,63 a conveyance in breach of the clause was
treated by the bank as a default invoking an acceleration clause.
The Ohio appellate court held the bank's interest to be "justifiable" 64 and said:
The right of the mortgagee to protect its security by maintaining
control over the identity and financial responsibility of the purchaser is a legitimate business objective and is not illegal, inequitable or contrary to the public policy ....
65
In Baltimore Life Insurance Co. v. Ham, 66 a 1971 case, the
Arizona appellate court penetrated the consent-to-sale clause by
58. Id.
59. Comment, Coast Bank v. Minderhout And The Reasonable Restraint On Alienation: Creature Of Commercial Ambiguity, 12 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 954, 960 (1965).
60. Id.
61. Peoples Say. Ass'n v. Standard Indus., Inc., 22 Ohio App. 2d 35,
257 N.E.2d 406 (1970).
62. Stith v. Hudson City Say. Institution, 63 Misc. 2d 863, 313 N.Y.S.2d

804 (1970).

63. 22 Ohio App. 2d 35, 257 N.E.2d 406 (1970).

64. Id. at 38, 257 N.E.2d at 407.
65. Id. at 38, 257 N.E.2d at 408.
66. 15 Ariz. App. 78, 486 P.2d 190 (1970).
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insisting that reasonableness in invoking the clause must be apparent from the pleadings:
The acceleration clause in this case is clearly a restraint on
the mortgagors' ability to dispose of their property. We believe
that so long as an acceleration clause does not purport to restrict
absolutely the mortgagors' ability to dispose of their property
there is not the type of restraint on alienation that would render
the clause void. It follows that the invocation of the 67clause must
be based on grounds that are reasonable on their face.
This decision demonstrates the flexibility of using the reasonable restraint test. Magic words and phrases do not alone
bring the matter within the bounds of some artificial exception
to a rule and automatically confer validation upon it. Instead,
a restraint which is reasonable and offends no social policy
against alienation can be scrutinized to ensure that its use is
proper. The court's burden in such instances can be lessened
by leaving it to the parties to show reasonableness in their plead-

ings. 68

In Mutual Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Wisconsin Wire Works,6 9 an action was brought to foreclose a real estate
mortgage after the defendant had conveyed the property in violation of the consent-to-sale clause. The court held:
We find nothing unreasonable in respect to the clause that
accelerates the payment of the entire balance upon a conveyance without the consent of the mortgagee. 70
Finally, in Malouff v. Midland Federal Savings and Loan
Association7 1 the court sustained a "due-on-sale" clause. 72 But
more importantly the court discussed the reasonable restraint
test at length:
The common law doctrine of restraints on alienation is a part of
67. Id. at 82, 486 P.2d at 193.
68. The Ham court devoted most of its effort to weighing not the reasonableness of the clause, but rather the manner in which it was used.
Thus, by applying the reasonable restraint test to consent-to-sale clauses,
the courts are free to sustain their use where social policy is found to
support it and also, the court can void the clause where its use traverses
the limits set by social policy. See Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 252 Ark. 849, 481 S.W.2d 725 (1972).
69. 58 Wis. 2d 99, 205 N.W.2d 762 (1973).
70. Id. at 112, 205 N.W.2d at 770.
71. 509 P.2d 1240 (Colo. 1973).
72. A due-on-sale clause is identical to the consent-to-sale clause in
operation. Like the consent-to-sale clause, a due-on-sale clause operates
to activate an acceleration clause when the sale clause is violated. The
difference between the two clauses is merely conceptual. Under the consent-to-sale clause, the mortgagee consents to, or withholds consent from,
the sale and upon violation of the clause invokes the acceleration clause.
Under the due-on-sale clause, consent to any sale is withheld automatically by the clause, but consent may be given by agreement or waiver
of the due-on-sale provision. Again, upon violation of the clause, the
mortgagee may invoke the acceleration clause. The practical difference
is that where the consent-to-sale clause is used, the mortgagee must take
an additional step by first withholding its consent before invoking the
acceleration clause.
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the law in Colorado. . . . In determining what restraints are
invalid, some legal scholars have declared that all restraints on
alienation are invalid unless they fall within certain recognized
categories of exceptions ...
In contrast to this rigid approach is the view that holds a
restraint on alienation may or may not be invalid, depending
upon the reasonableness of the restraint. . . . [T]he rule
against restraints on alienation relates to unreasonable restraints.
We subscribe to the view that the question of the invalidity
of a restraint depends upon its73reasonableness in view of the
justifiable interest of the parties.
Thus it can be seen that since Minderhout the reasonableness
of an attempted restraint is gaining widespread recognition as
applied to consent-to-sale clauses. No appellate court has yet
invalidated the clause on the basis that it is unreasonable.
CONCLUSION
BALANCING THE INTEREST

Public policy is the reason most cited for the rule against
restraints on alienation. Conflicting with that doctrine are considerations of freedom of contract and economic vitality through
secured transactions. All of these doctrines are giants in the
law, constituting the premises and presuppositions called upon
daily, almost unwittingly, by the student and practitioner of the
law. When such giants meet head on, mediation appears hopeless. Here, however, the use of the reasonable restraint test can
reconcile considerable conflict.
Under the strict rule against restraints on alienation, social
policy demands such restraints be treated as void. Such restraints tend to take property out of commerce with the undesirable consequences that a natural increase in value will occur,
that improvements will be discouraged and that property will
not be put to its most beneficial use. In the case of the mortgage
consent-to-sale clause, the concerns of public policy are protected,
even fostered. By giving lenders proper security on their investments, money used to mortgage real estate transactions is more
readily available at lower costs. Availability of funds facilitates
land ownership by more people, thereby increasing the frequency
of alienability. Also, persons liable for large sums on a mortgage
have sound reason to maintain and improve their property because such improvements will increase values and insure against
financial loss. Finally, the increased availability of mortgages
will provide incentives for increasing the effective use of property.
73. 509 P.2d 1240, 1243 (Colo. 1973) (emphasis by court).
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In addition to the public policy objections, the doctrine of

repugnancy is sanctimoniously expounded. This doctrine is
aimed at preventing any demise of the fee simple-an estate
which by definition contains no restraints.

It is argued that any

restraint of freedom of the right of alienability so crucially a
part of the fee simple is repugnant to the very concept of fee
simple. However, the consent-to-sale clause does not prevent
alienation, for the parties may join and alienate the property
at any time. Also, why not conceptually create another estate
in land, lesser than the fee simple, which will allow for proper
restraints?
In conclusion, alienation of property is more likely to flourish
when mortgagees can adequately secure their loans. Strict application of the rule against restraints on alienation, to the exclusion of the consent-to-sale clause, may decrease the willingness of mortgagees to loan money and, ironically, be its own restraint on alienation.
James E. Saloga

